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Abstract 
The energy consumer is at the centre of the European Union's energy policies. 
Consumer's active participation is considered as a prerequisite for managing the energy 
transition successfully and in a cost-effective way. The recent measures proposed by the 
European Commission with the 'Clean Energy for all Europeans' rely on smart grid 
technologies, solutions and concepts to accelerate, transform and consolidate the EU  
clean energy transition.  
In this context, the aim of this report is to present an agent based model of the 
electricity consumer (SIMP – Subjective Individual Model of Prosumer). The model can be 
used as a tool to better understand the impact that innovative energy services, enabled 
by smart grid technologies, may have on the electricity consumers and the society at 
large. Furthermore, the model can be used as a tool to gain insight into diffusion patterns 
of energy services (in this report represented by electricity contracts) and associated 
switching rates. As such, it contributes to the understanding of what fosters and what 
hinders an effective deployment of innovative energy services. 
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1 Introduction 
The objective of the agent-based model SIMP – Subjective Individual Model of Prosumer 
– is to explore the diffusion of energy services, enabled by smart metering technologies, 
among a population of interacting electricity prosumers and to evaluate the impact of 
such diffusion on individual and societal performance indicators. Agent Based Modelling 
(ABM) is increasingly being considered as a suitable tool to address the complexity of 
socio-technical systems that are characterized by a strong interaction between the 
human and the technical system (Gilbert, 2008) (van Dam et al., 2013). Therefore, ABM 
represents an appropriate tool to describe and simulate the complexity of the consumer 
role in the emerging energy systems.  
The model architecture, model parameters and model simulation have been presented in 
"An agent-based model of electricity consumer: smart metering policy implications in 
Europe" (Vasiljevska et al., 2017) and in "Prosumer behaviour in emerging electricity 
systems" (Mengolini, 2017). The aim of this report is to present the model structure and 
code in more details and as such, it should be seen as supportive documentation to the 
documents mentioned above. SIMP is implemented in Netlogo (Wilensky, 1999). 
The report is structured as follows: chapter 2 describes the model pseudocode by making 
a clear reference to the source code. Chapter 3 sheds some light on the future 
developments of the model, where the authors present an integrated framework under 
which the current model could be further extended. The source code of the model is 
included in the annex. 
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2 SIMP – Subjective Individual Model of Prosumer 
The model consists of a number of agents, representing households and of a portfolio of 
electricity contracts, representing different energy services offered by an electricity 
retailer.   
Consumers are modelled as household agents having dynamic preferences on the types 
of electricity contracts offered by the retailer. Development of these preferences depends 
on consumers' personal values, memory and attitudes, as well as the degree of 
interaction in a social network structure. 
2.1 What is it 
The model aims to provide better understanding of the impact that smart metering 
systems may have on the electricity consumers and the society at large, and in particular 
on the deployment of thereby enabled energy services. Therefore, the model can be used 
as a tool to gain insight into diffusion patterns of energy services (represented by an 
electricity contract) and associated switching rate among contracts. 
2.2 How it works 
Electricity consumers are modelled as household agents having dynamic preferences on 
types of electricity contracts offered by the retailer. The agents interact with the 
electricity network and the retailer through electricity contracts and develop preferences 
on different contract types, depending on their personal values, memory and attitudes, 
as well as the degree of interaction in a social network structure. In this regard, the 
agents and the electricity network represent a socio-technical system whose behaviour 
may be influenced by the experience of other consumers, as well as the behaviour of 
other actors, such as for example, retailers and national/local authorities through market 
dynamics and national policies. While such policies and institutions can be influenced and 
shaped by agent’s behaviour and evolve over time, for the purpose of this model they 
stay exogenous and fixed.   
The decision making process is modelled as a multi-criteria decision making problem and 
it consists of two sub-models, as presented in Figure 1. 
Sub-model I: Decision making on switching to different contract 
Each time step an agent gets experience with a certain contract (NetLogo procedure calc-
experienced-outcomes, Figure 2), which is modelled as a random value drawn from a 
predefined contract specific set (Table 3). This experience is then normalised and put in 
the agent's memory, and it is updated with every new experience (NEtLogo procedure 
normalise-experienced-outcomes, Figure 2). Based on the updated score and the 
agent’s specific weighting factors (Table 2, agent-specific variables) - which reflect the 
relative importance an agent gives to certain criterion: financial savings, comfort change, 
CO2 savings and social welfare - the agent develops an overall attitude towards a certain 
contract (NetLogo procedure calc-attitudes, Figure 2). 
Ultimately, based on this attitude and the agent-specific attitude threshold (Table 2, 
simulation parameters), the agent decides to switch to a different contract or stay with 
the current one (NetLogo procedure am-i-satisfied, Figure 2).  
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Figure 1. Agents' decision making process 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Figure 2 provides a screenshot of the main NetLogo procedures related with the sub-
model I. 
  
6 
Figure 2. Screenshot of the NetLogo code file (sub-model I) 
 
 
 
 
Sub-model II: Choosing contract from portfolio of contracts  
The contract choice is modelled as a multi-criteria decision making problem and follows 
the same structure for all agents. The agent receives a portfolio of contracts and based 
on her perception of technological risks associated with each contract (Table 2, contract-
specific variables) and agent’s specific techno-tolerance threshold (Table 2, agent-specific 
variables), the agent evaluates only contracts with perceived technological risks above 
her techno-tolerance threshold, whereas the rest of the contracts are discarded. The 
evaluation process includes agent’s personal attitudes (NetLogo procedure evaluate-
contract, Figure 3) as well as attitudes of peers' agents, i.e. social influence (NetLogo 
procedure ask-neighbours-opinion, Figure 3). Finally, the best scoring contract is the 
one to be adopted (NetLogo procedure choose-contract, Figure 3). 
Figure 3 provides a screenshot of the main NetLogo procedures related with the sub-
model II.  
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Figure 3. Screenshot of the NetLogo code file (sub-model II) 
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2.3 How to use it 
The key questions the model tries to answer are: 1) how smart metering technologies, 
and thereby enabled services can be promoted under different policy settings and 
effectively adopted by the consumers and 2) how this technological diffusion affects 
individual and societal performance indicators. The outcomes are, however, not meant as 
predictions, but rather an exploration of the mechanisms at play. 
Below we provide a description of the variables (also summarised in Table 2) and the 
main outputs, as observed in the NETlogo interface tab (Figure 4). 
Figure 4. Screen shot of the SIMP GUI (at the beginning and at the end of the simulation) 
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Policy: The model is intended to explore possible diffusion rates of smart metering under 
different policy interventions and, as a result, it provides an insight into diffusion patterns 
of energy services and associated consumers’ switching rates. In this context, and in line 
with the current EU developments in the area of smart metering, three policy 
interventions have been subject to experimental setup and data analysis in the model 
(presented as slider in the GUI, Figure 4): 
 Policy 0 – mandatory installation of smart metering systems, which mandates the 
Distribution System Operator (DSO) to install a smart meter at the consumer's 
premises and the consumer is required to accept the meter. 
 Policy 11 – voluntary installation of smart metering systems where the consumer 
can refuse the smart meter ("opt-out option") or turn off the option to remotely 
exchange consumption data with the supplier or any third party and to be remotely 
disconnected ("administrative-off" option).   
 Policy 3 – voluntary installation of smart metering systems encouraged by an 
environmental campaign, and thereby promoting the environmental benefits of 
smart metering enabled services. 
Initial contract distribution: consumers-contract-A, consumers-contract-B, 
consumers-contract-C, consumers-contract-D, consumers-contract-E, consumers-
contract-F, consumers-contract-G represent the set of contracts available to the 
consumer at the beginning of the simulation (depending on the policy, see Table 1). Each 
contract is characterised with contract duration, individual and societal indicators 
(financial and CO2 savings, comfort change and social welfare) and perceived 
technological risk associated with the smart metering system. All contracts are assumed 
to be initially equally distributed among the agents. Additionally, further experiments 
with different initial contract distributions have been performed (Table 4). Table 1 
illustrates the types of contracts available in each policy.  
Table 1. Available contract types per policy 
 
Policy 
Contract 
A B C D E F G 
1 No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Source: own elaboration 
Contract-duration: we assume that each contract has a duration of 12 months 
(minimum contract duration observed in most EU member states). Alternatively, the 
model is tested under the assumption of indefinite contract duration so as to analyse the 
effect of "lock-in" periods, during which the consumer would need to pay a penalty in 
case she ends up the contract prematurely.  
Share-ego, share-hedo, share-bio, share-alt define consumers’ archetype. Consumer 
agents are characterised by weighting factors (or weights), which reflect the relative 
importance an agent gives to a certain criterion (hereinafter called performance 
indicator): financial savings, comfort change, CO2 savings and social welfare. The weights 
are randomly assigned to each agent, following a uniform distribution [0; 1] and they are 
                                           
1 the case of the Dutch smart metering roll-out 
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normalised so that the sum of the weights assigned to each agent equals to 1. The 
highest weighting factor determines the archetype the agent belongs to. Initially, we 
assume an equal distribution of each archetype.  
Threshold-attitude is used to measure the agent’s satisfaction with a certain contract. 
If the overall attitude is lower than the threshold attitude, the agent decides to change 
contract.  
Heterogeneity represents the number of peers belonging to a different archetype than 
agent’s own. An agent may decide to adopt a certain contract based on the experience 
other agents in the social network have with the same contract and the value the agent 
gives to the opinion of those other agents (i.e. susceptibility).  
Susceptibility measures the importance the agent gives to the opinion of her peers 
regarding a certain type of contract. It is drawn from a uniform distribution between min 
susceptibility and max susceptibility (presented as slider in the GUI, Figure 4). 
Nr-of-interactions: interaction occurs through social influence among household agents 
interconnected in the social network. In such network, agents communicate directly with 
a randomly chosen number of agents and the interactions depend on the heterogeneity 
level and susceptibility.  
Table 2 describes the model parameters and variables used in the simulation. Empirical 
values were not available for most of the parameters and as a result, synthetic data were 
used, based on expert judgment and the same were extensively varied. Nevertheless, 
wherever a source is given, the parameter value is empirically based. 
Table 2. Model parameters and variables used in the simulation  
Simulation parameters 
Variable name  Brief description  Value  Source 
nr-of-interactions Number of peers each agent communicates 
with 
5 - 
policy The policy determines what contracts are 
available, and whether an environmental 
campaign is introduced at t=40 months 
mandatory, voluntary, 
environmental 
 
heterogeneity Number (in terms of %) of peers belonging 
to different archetype than the agent's 
own. 
0.5 - 
Initial contract 
distribution 
Contract distribution among agents at the 
beginning of the simulation 
Equal distribution or all 
agents have the least 
technologically 
advanced contract 
(contract A or B, 
depending on the 
policy) 
- 
threshold-attitude Used to measure the agent satisfaction 
with the certain contract. If the overall 
attitude is lower than the threshold-
attitude, agent decides to change contract. 
0.5 - 
contract-duration Contract time duration 12 months or indefinite - 
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Simulation variables depending on the parameterization 
Variable name  Brief description  Value  Source 
N Number of household agents, depending 
on the policy 
200 (policy 0) or 
280 (policy 1 and 2) 
- 
Available contracts The contracts that are available to the 
consumers, depending on the policy 
{B,C,E,F,G} or 
{A,B,C,D,E,F,G}  
- 
Environmental 
campaign 
Determines whether or not an 
environmental campaign is introduced in 
month 40 and it depends on the policy 
yes or no - 
Agent-specific variables  
Variable name  Brief description  Value  Source 
Weighting factors: 
𝒘𝒆, 𝒘𝒉, 𝒘𝒃, 𝒘𝒂 
Measure of relative importance agent gives to 
certain criterion (egoistic, hedonic, biospheric, 
altruistic) 
Chosen from 
uniform 
distribution 
[0,1] 
- 
Susceptibility 𝒘𝑺𝑵 Measure of the importance agent gives to the 
opinion of her social network peers  
0.5 - 
techno-tolerance 
threshold 
Contract acceptance level due to perceived risks 
associated with smart metering technology  
[1,11] - 
Contract-specific variables 
𝒂𝒆𝒎𝒊𝒏,𝒂𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒙 communicated range for financial 
savings  
See Table 3  Eurostat 
statistics 
explained 
𝒂𝒉𝒎𝒊𝒏,𝒂𝒉𝒎𝒂𝒙 communicated range for comfort change  See Table 3  B. 
Boardman 
et al. 
𝒂𝒃𝒎𝒊𝒏,𝒂𝒃𝒎𝒂𝒙 communicated range for CO2 savings See Table 3  Covenant 
of mayors, 
2010 
𝒂𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒏,𝒂𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒙 communicated range for social welfare  See Table 3  S. Darby et 
al., 2012 
techno-risks perceived technological risks  [1, 6] - 
Source: own elaboration 
Table 3. Communicated outcomes per contract type 
Contract Financial 
savings [€] 
Comfort change [%] CO2 emissions savings [t] Social welfare [%] 
A [0; 0.1] [0; 0.1] [0; 0.5] [10; 20] 
B [0.54; 0.66] [0; 0.1] [1; 2] [10; 20] 
C [0.54; 0.66] [0; 0.1] [1; 2] [10; 20] 
D [1.08; 1.32] [-6; -4] [2; 4] [20; 30] 
E [2.2; 2.6] [-12; -8] [5; 7] [20; 30] 
F [3.2; 4] [-12; -8] [8; 10] [30; 40] 
G [5; 7] [-17; -13] [12; 16] [40; 50] 
Source: own elaboration 
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Average-tolerance-satisfaction: average value of the techno-tolerance-satisfaction, 
described as the difference between the agent specific techno-tolerance-threshold (Table 
2) and the technological risks (techno-risks, Table 2) associated with the adopted 
contract. The techno-tolerance-threshold is initialized at the beginning of the simulation 
as a random number drawn from a predefined set and the techno-risk has predefined 
value for each contract, based on the smart meter functionalities enabled for the specific 
contract, and it does not change during the model simulation (Table 2, contract-specific 
variables). 
Average-attitude-satisfaction: average value of the attitude-satisfaction described as 
a difference between the agent’s general attitude regarding a certain contract and the 
agent specific attitude threshold (threshold-attitude, Table 2). 
Contract adoption: plots the total distribution of all contracts at each time step, during 
the whole simulation period. 
Contract adoption ego: plots the total distribution of contracts among the egoistic 
archetype of agents at each time step, during the whole simulation period. 
Contract adoption hedo: plots the total distribution of contracts among the hedonic 
archetype of agents at each time step, during the whole simulation period. 
Contract adoption bio: plots the total distribution of contracts among the biospheric 
archetype of agents at each time step, during the whole simulation period. 
Contract adoption alt: plots the total distribution of contracts among the altruistic 
archetype of agents at each time step, during the whole simulation period.  
Experimental set-up 
As previously mentioned, we are interested to understand the impact of the agents' 
switching behaviour on system level outcomes, such as adoption of contract types, 
average financial savings, average CO2 savings, average comfort change and average 
social welfare. The parameter values vary between runs due to the stochastics used 
during agents' initialization and model execution. Therefore, to be able to arrive at 
realistic assessment of patterns observed in the simulated system evolution, we need to 
do a statistical analysis of the results of many runs. To this end, we build an 
experimental set-up relative to the following variables: heterogeneity, policy, initial 
contract distribution and contract duration. Heterogeneity, however, as modelled in SIMP 
does not prove to have impact on the average contract distribution. This is due to the 
fact that egoistic, biospheric and altruistic agents have objectives which pull in the same 
direction, in terms of contract type preference, i.e. agents who belong to these three 
archetypes will behave similarly, whereas only hedonic agents will act differently. 
Therefore, the experimental set-up was build relative to the initial contract distribution 
and contract duration (Table 4) and each experiments was tested for each policy 
separately. The parameterisation for the simulation experiments is given in Table 2. The 
programming language R was used for the data analysis and the results are presented 
and extensively discussed in (Vasiljevska, Douw, Mengolini, & Nikolic, 2017).  
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Table 4. Experimental set-up 
Scenario Initial contract distribution Contract duration 
1 All agents have the least technologically advanced 
contract (B in the mandatory policy and A in the 
voluntary and environmental policy) 
12 months 
2 Equal contract distribution 12 months 
3 All agents have the least technologically advanced 
contract (B in the mandatory policy and A in the 
voluntary and environmental policy) 
Indefinite 
4 Equal contract distribution Indefinite 
Source: own elaboration 
An average contract distribution is observed at each time step to understand the 
reasoning behind the contract adoption patterns and influencing factors (incentives, 
social influence, etc.). Finally, average technology satisfaction and average attitude 
satisfaction have been analysed in each policy and among scenarios to understand the 
link between system level performance (in terms of financial savings, CO2 emissions 
reduction, etc.) and the agents' satisfaction level. A distinct pattern of distribution of 
contracts, system level outcomes and satisfaction level emerge from the analyses 
presented in (Vasiljevska, Douw, Mengolini, & Nikolic, 2017). 
2.4 Things to notice 
High switching rate among different contracts can be observed in the NETlogo interface 
tab (Figure 4): each household represents a consumer and it is assigned a colour 
defining the archetype she belongs to. Each column inside the patch monitor of the 
NetLogo interface tab (Figure 4) represents a contract type (NB: 5 contract types are 
available in policy 0 and 7 contract types are available in policy 1 and 2).  
The overall time distribution of contract adoption can be monitored in the graph contract 
adoption of the interface tab. Additionally, the time distribution of different contract 
adoptions per different consumer’s archetype can be observed in the graphs contract 
adoption ego, contract adoption hedo, contract adoption bio and contract adoption alt.  
We can see that more technologically advanced contracts, such as contract F and G are 
highly adopted among all consumers’ archetypes. This is caused by the fact that these 
are the best-scoring contracts for the 3 indicators (financial savings, CO2 savings and 
social welfare). Less technologically advanced contracts, such as A, B and C (in policy 2) 
are highly adopted among the hedonic type of consumers. 
The average attitude satisfaction is mostly close to zero or sometimes negative, which 
indicates high average switching rate. This can be associated with the experience agents 
get each time step, which is modelled as exogenous variable randomly drawn from a 
predefined set (specific for each contract). Also, the techno-tolerance threshold is 
exogenous, fixed at the initialization of the model, which prevents the agents to consider 
more "technologically risky" contracts that would yield better outcome (in terms of 
energy savings, CO2 reduction, etc.). This can be the reason why we observe high 
adoption rate of less technologically advanced contracts (e.g. contract A and B) also 
among the biospheric type of consumers. 
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2.5 Things to try 
When moving the policy slider in Figure 4 , we observe the following: 
 More technologically advanced contracts, such as contract F and G remain highly 
adopted in all policies.  
 There is a major difference in the adoption level of contract A and contract D when 
comparing the mandatory policy (policy 0) on the one hand, and the voluntary and 
environmental policy on the other hand (policy 1 and 2, respectively). This 
difference is caused by the fact that contract A and contract D are not available in 
the mandatory policy.  
 There are no significant differences in the adoption level of the contract types 
between the voluntary (policy 1) and environmental policy (policy 2) even though 
one would expect that the environmental policy and the associated increase of 
biospheric consumers would yield a higher share of more advanced contracts. This 
can be explained by the fact that the techno-tolerance threshold, as currently 
modelled, does not vary by archetype. As a result, increase in the number of 
biospheric consumers does not necessarily lead to increased adoption of more 
technologically advanced contracts, as biospheric consumers can still be highly 
concerned with the technological risks associated with more advanced contracts. 
 Granting the consumers opt-out and "administrative-off" option for smart metering 
system (in policy 1) results in increased number of consumers opting for a less 
technologically advanced contract (i.e., contract A or D). Also, we see that granting 
consumers more options (as a way to tackle technology related concerns), does not 
necessarily lead to higher energy and CO2 savings and ultimately higher consumers’ 
satisfaction. This effect remains strong even under the environmental policy (policy 
2) where despite significant number of agents becoming more environmentally 
concerned, the adoption of contracts that do not require data sharing with DSOs 
(e.g. contract A and D) still remains significant. 
 Technologically advanced contracts that yield higher benefits may also be subject 
to technology associated concerns, as perceived by the consumers. In this respect, 
the average techno-tolerance satisfaction appears to be the lowest in the 
environmental policy, where consumers opt for more technologically advanced 
contracts.   
 Moving the policy slider and varying the contract duration along with the initial 
contract distribution do not seem to significantly affect the average total-attitude 
satisfaction. This can be associated with the high diversity of the agents’ population 
(in terms of agents’ archetype).  
 Moving the heterogeneity slider in Figure 4, does not have significant impact on the 
average contract distribution. This is due to the fact that egoistic, biospheric and 
altruistic agents have objectives which pull in the same direction, in terms of 
contract type preference, i.e. agents who belong to these three archetypes will 
behave similarly, whereas hedonic agents will act differently. As such, more 
technologically advanced contracts that would yield higher energy and financial 
savings, would also result in higher CO2 savings and increased social welfare. 
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2.6 Model boundaries 
The SIMP model provides insight into diffusion patterns of energy services (represented 
by a contract) and associated switching rate among predefined set of contracts offered 
by a retailer. Each time the agent decides to opt for a new contract, she gets the same 
types of contracts, i.e. there are no new types of contracts available on the market. In 
reality, retailers may develop new contracts on the basis of the current market share, 
thereby reflecting consumers' preferences and attitudes towards the contracts currently 
available, which may also result in some contract types disappearing over time, while 
others persisting for longer period. In this case, we could consider multiple retailers with 
different marketing strategies, based on specific consumers' characteristics.  
The experience the agents get with each contract is modelled as exogenous variable, 
each time step randomly drawn from a predefined set of values for each performance 
indicator, whereas the evaluation of the current contract shall reflect upon learning 
effects from past experiences and adapt the current experience accordingly (e.g. through 
adaptive set for each indicator).  
Additionally, the attitude threshold and techno-tolerance threshold are also exogenous, 
fixed at the initialization of the model. Fixed techno-tolerance threshold means that 
consumers disregard the contracts that are below their techno-tolerance threshold every 
time they opt for a contract change. Such an approach prevents the agent to consider 
more "technologically risky" contracts at the expense of better outcome (in terms of 
energy savings, environmental impact, etc.). Some consumers might be more "tech-
savvy" and thus be less concerned with technological risk than others. Also, the 
perception for more "technologically risky" contracts may change over time, owing to the 
experience an agent has with a specific contract, which can ultimately result in adaptive 
techno-tolerance threshold. Similarly, attitude threshold shall consider agents’ learning 
and adaptation and therefore be reflexive and reactive to the environment.  
Though the model is named Subjective Individual Model of Prosumers, we currently 
model consumers' behaviour and do not consider self-generation. Future developments 
will extend the current model to include engagement strategies and energy services 
related to self-generation and self-consumption.  
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3 An integrated approach to consumer, retail market and 
electricity network 
The Subjective Individual Model of Prosumer models the interaction of the electricity 
consumer with smart metering technologies and thereby enabled services, represented 
by electricity contracts. The electricity consumer is modelled as an individual and social 
agent who, through her interaction with the electricity retailer and the DSO, can affect 
the development of the future retail market.  
The analysis of how the consumer/prosumer interacts with the electricity network and 
the market is of relevance for the current development of the EU internal energy market. 
For this reason, our aim is to integrate SIMP with the physical grid and the retail energy 
market. We foresee a modular architecture (Figure 5), where we will be able to simulate 
the interaction of several actors (agents) communicating among each other and 
impacting each other's actions. This integrated model includes four modules and each 
module can involve several actors: 
 The household (including different consumers/prosumers);  
 The retail market (including consumers, prosumers, retailers, different types of 
service providers, electricity producers, DSO as neutral market facilitator, etc.);  
 The electricity network (including the DSO and the TSO, as responsible for 
operation of the distribution and the transmission network, respectively); 
 The governance (including regulatory authorities, local energy agencies, 
municipalities, etc.).  
Figure 5. Integrated framework for consumer, retail market and electricity network 
 
Source: own elaboration 
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The household module defines a set of rules associated with the load control mechanisms 
and linked with the consumers' behavioural patterns. This set of rules is partly defined in 
a contract, between the consumer and a retailer, or alternatively between the consumer 
and a service provider (e.g. aggregator, ESCO, etc.). These set of rules are linked with 
the consumers' values and preferences. In turn, these preferences affect both the 
contract choice (SIMP), but also the consumption profile, as they are encoded into the 
Home Energy Management System (HEMS). Also, HEMS integrates the set-points of 
different household appliances, distributed energy resources (photovoltaic panels, 
residential storage, etc.), electric vehicle, etc. and thus, it serves as interface for 
provision of different energy services (e.g. demand response). The output of this module 
is the evolution of consumption/production profiles under different consumers' 
behaviours.  
The retail market module defines rules of the market dynamics among a multitude of 
actors, both traditional and new actors entering the scene. The rules for market 
functioning are defined by the regulator, which plays a key role in promoting well-
functioning retail market. The output of this module is twofold: 1) market share of 
electricity retailers and service providers, and 2) evolution of contracts with innovative 
services beyond electricity supply (e.g. flexibility). In most of the EU Member States, 
electricity contracts are offered to the consumer by a retailer as a single contact point, 
that is also responsible for billing, whereas the DSO operates as an interface between the 
economic transactions and the physical network, playing the role of a neutral market 
facilitator. Different data management models are largely discussed in Europe (CEER, 
2016) and in most of the EU countries, smart metering data are managed by the DSO, 
which then, upon consumer's consent, communicates these data to the retailer and any 
third party. Alternatively, there is an increasing trend in EU towards centralised data 
management model, by using a data hub (Figure 5). 
In this context, different service providers (e.g. aggregators, ESCOs, etc.) may act on 
behalf of some consumers/prosumers and provide services to the retailer (e.g. portfolio 
balancing) or the DSO (congestion management, voltage support, etc.). Alternatively, 
retailers may enter in direct contact with the consumers/prosumers and provide different 
data analytics and comparison tools for increasing awareness of electricity use and 
request different services (e.g. demand response via variable electricity prices). As a 
result, following the consumers' preferences on contract choice (SIMP), retailers may 
come up with targeted marketing strategies and contracts for different types of 
consumers. At the same time, this will affect the market share of specific contracts or 
retailers. At the end, such evolution of contract's share and electricity consumption 
profiles will impact the operation of the electricity network and consequently necessitate 
a coordinated approach between the market and the electricity network operation.    
The electricity network module represents the physical electricity grid with all the loads, 
power plants, lines, buses and other network equipment, where the magnitude of 
production and consumption must essentially match at all points in time. Technically, this 
is accomplished by the ramping up and down of variable output generation units, which 
in presence of growing RES penetration proves each time more challenging. Additionally, 
this may result in stretching the capacity of some power lines close to their limits or pose 
a significant challenge on the voltage, particularly in the low voltage area of the 
distribution network. As a result, the need for flexibility, both at the demand and the 
generation side, increases, which calls for development of innovative flexibility services, 
specified under a contract between the consumer/prosumer and the DSO/service 
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provider. For that reason, this module also communicates to the SIMP (through the 
retailer or service provider) and as such, it can have effect on and be affected by the 
consumer preferences for electricity service contracts. In most of the EU Member States, 
the DSO owns and operates the smart meter (SWD, 2014). The metered data are then 
collected, validated and processed by the Meter Data Management System and used for 
different applications, such as billing, demand response, outage management, workforce 
management, etc. Alternatively, the metered data can be sent directly to an independent 
data hub. 
This module returns network load as an output, and specifically, the need for different 
network management services, such as voltage support, congestion management, etc.     
The governance module represents an overarching module, where public policies are 
shaped and implemented and consequently, it has impacts and is impacted by the other 
modules.  
19 
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Annex: SIMP source code 
Creating the model ("setup" module): 
to setup 
clear-all   
set evaluation-period 120  
set EGOISTIC  0 
set HEDONIC  1       
set BIOSPHERIC 2 
set ALTRUISTIC 3 
init-contracts 
init-prosumers 
check-archetype-shares 
reset-ticks 
clear-all-plots 
plot-outcomes 
end           (end of 'setup' module) 
"setup" procedures 
to init-contracts  
(set the initial values of the contracts for each performance indicator, i.e. communicated-
outcome – ego: euros saved per month; hedo: percentage increase of comfort; bio: 
reduced kg CO2 per month; alt: percentage increase of social welfare)  
if policy = 0 [ 
set communicated-outcomes matrix: from-row-list 
[0.54 0.66   0    0.1    1    2   0.1 0.2]      [contract B] 
[0.54 0.66   0    0.1    1    2   0.1 0.2]     [contract C] 
[2.2 2.6 -12   -8      5    7   0.2 0.3]     [contract E] 
[3.2 4.0 -12   -8      8   10   0.3 0.4]     [contract F] 
[5    7.0 -17 -13     12   16   0.4 0.5]]     [contract G] 
(set the technological risk for each contract) 
set techno-risks (list 1 2 4 5 6)] 
if policy = 1 or policy = 2  
[set communicated-outcomes matrix: from-row-list 
[0    0.1    0    0.1   0    0.5 0.1 0.2]     [contract A] 
[0.54 0.66   0    0.1   1    2   0.1 0.2]     [contract B] 
[0.54 0.66   0    0.1   1    2   0.1 0.2]     [contract C] 
[1.08 1.32 -6   -4     2    4   0.2 0.3]     [contract D] 
[2.2 2.6 -12   -8     5    7   0.2 0.3]      [contract E] 
[3.2 4.0 -12   -8     8   10   0.3 0.4]     [contract F] 
[5    7.0 -17 -13    12   16   0.4 0.5]]     [contract G] 
(set the technological risk for each contract) 
set techno-risks (list 1 1 2 3 4 5 6)] 
(set global variable with the dimensions of the communicated outcomes) 
let dimensions matrix: dimensions communicated-outcomes 
set nr-of-contracts item 0 dimensions 
set nr-of-perf-ind (item 1 dimensions) / 2 
(initialize the communicated-outcomes for later use) 
set extremes-of-communicated-outcomes matrix:from-row-list (n-values 1 [n-values (nr-
of-perf-ind * 2) [-100]]) 
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ask patches with [pxcor = 0] [set pcolor grey] 
ask patches with [pxcor = 1] [] 
ask patches with [pxcor = 2] [set pcolor grey] 
ask patches with [pxcor = 3] [] 
ask patches with [pxcor = 4] [set pcolor grey] 
ask patches with [pxcor = 5] [] 
ask patches with [pxcor = 6] [set pcolor grey] 
(get the highest and lowest value of all performance indicators, i.e. communicated-
outcomes for all contracts) 
let pi-nr 0 
while [ pi-nr < nr-of-perf-ind] 
(get the lowest lower boundary, and the highest higher boundary across all contracts for 
the performance indicator with pi-nr) 
(start by getting the values of contract 0) 
[let contract-nr 0 
let min-outcome matrix: get communicated-outcomes contract-nr ( pi-nr * 2 ) 
let max-outcome matrix: get communicated-outcomes contract-nr ( pi-nr * 2 + 1 ) 
(iterate over the rest of the contracts to see whether they have higher maximums or 
lower minimums) 
set contract-nr contract-nr + 1 
while [ contract-nr < nr-of-contracts ]  
[set range matrix: get communicated-outcomes contract-nr pi-nr 
       if matrix: get communicated-outcomes contract-nr (pi-nr * 2) < min-outcome [ 
set min-outcome matrix: get communicated-outcomes contract-nr (pi-nr * 2)] 
if matrix: get communicated-outcomes contract-nr (pi-nr * 2 + 1) > max-
outcome [set max-outcome matrix: get communicated-outcomes contract-nr (pi-
nr * 2 + 1)] 
       set contract-nr contract-nr + 1] 
     matrix: set extremes-of-communicated-outcomes 0 (pi-nr * 2) min-outcome 
     matrix: set extremes-of-communicated-outcomes 0 (pi-nr * 2 + 1) max-outcome 
set pi-nr pi-nr + 1] 
normalize-communicated-outcomes 
end               (end of procedure 'init-contracts) 
 
to init-prosumers 
(prosumers initially having contract A) 
create-prosumers (prosumers-contract-A) [set current-contract-nr A]  
(prosumers initially having contract B) 
create-prosumers (prosumers-contract-B) [set current-contract-nr B] 
 
Providing the main time step ("go" module):  
to go  
show-debug-message word "*** TICK *** " ticks -1 
ask prosumers [ 
set changed-contract? false 
(agents get experience with the current contract) 
calc-experienced-outcomes 
(normalisation of the outcomes from the current contract) 
normalise-experienced-outcomes 
(agents built attitude towards the current contract)  
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calc-attitudes 
let satisfied? am-i-satisfied 
let contract-ended? ( elapsed-contract-time >= contract-duration ) 
(if the agent is not satisfied with the current contract OR if the contract has ended) 
ifelse not satisfied? or contract-ended?  
[let loop-contract-nr 0 
while [loop-contract-nr < nr-of-contracts ]  
(iterate over available contracts to ask neighbours' opinion) 
[ask-neighbours-opinions loop-contract-nr 
(disregard the contracts that have a techno-tolerance value higher than the agent's 
own one) 
(first determine which contract is the least 'technologically invasive') 
let min-techno-risk min techno-risks 
let least-risky-contract position min-techno-risk techno-risks 
if techno-tolerance-threshold < item loop-contract-nr techno-risks  
(leave this contract out of the consideration if it is not the least 'technologically 
invasive' one) 
[if loop-contract-nr != least-risky-contract  
[set influenced-expected-general-attitudes replace-item loop-contract-nr influenced-
expected-general-attitudes  -100 
set loop-contract-nr loop-contract-nr + 1] 
(insert a value of -100 in the influenced-expected-general-attitudes if the contract is not 
considered) 
if not satisfied?  
(leave the current contract out of the consideration) 
[set influenced-expected-general-attitudes replace-item current-contract-nr influenced-
expected-general-attitudes  -100] 
ifelse max influenced-expected-general-attitudes != -100   
(choose the offer with the highest influenced-expected-general-attitudes) 
[choose-contract 
set elapsed-contract-time 0] 
[if contract-ended?  
[set elapsed-contract-time 0]]] 
(if prosumer is satisfied and the contract did not end) 
[set elapsed-contract-time elapsed-contract-time + 1] 
calculate-satisfactions   
]           (end of procedure 'ask prosumers')  
plot-outcomes 
tick 
(for Policy = 2: Change environmental weights of all agents, 4 years after the start of the 
simulation) 
if ticks = 40 and policy = 2  
[do-environmental-campaign 
] 
if ticks >= evaluation-period  
[stop] 
end                (end of 'go' module) 
 
"go" procedures 
(agents get experience with the current contract) 
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to calc-experienced-outcomes 
let pi-nr 0 
(iterate over the performance indicators, i.e. outcomes) 
while [ pi-nr < nr-of-perf-ind ]  
(calculate the experienced outcome) 
[let min-outcome matrix: get communicated-outcomes current-contract-nr (pi-nr * 
2) 
let max-outcome matrix: get communicated-outcomes current-contract-nr (pi-nr * 2 
+ 1) 
let outcome min-outcome + random-float (max-outcome - min-outcome) 
(put the outcome in the list for the current time step) 
set experienced-outcomes replace-item pi-nr experienced-outcomes outcome 
(add the outcome to the total outcomes)  
set total-outcomes replace-item pi-nr total-outcomes (( item pi-nr total-outcomes ) 
+outcome ) 
set pi-nr pi-nr + 1] 
end         (end of procedure 'calc-experienced-outcomes') 
 
(normalisation of the outcomes from the current contract) 
to normalise-experienced-outcomes 
let loop-pi-nr 0 
let normalised-experienced-outcomes n-values nr-of-perf-ind [-100] 
for each experienced-outcomes  
[let experienced-outcome ? 
let normalised-experienced-outcome normalise loop-pi-nr experienced-outcome 
set normalised-experienced-outcomes replace-item loop-pi-nr normalised-     
experienced-outcomes normalised-experienced-outcome 
set loop-pi-nr loop-pi-nr + 1] 
(put the normalised experience with the current contract into the memory] 
matrix:set-row normalised-experienced-outcomes-memory current-contract-nr 
normalised-experienced-outcomes 
end         (end of procedure 'normalise-experienced-outcomes') 
 
(agents built attitude towards the current contract)  
to calc-attitudes 
let normalized-experienced-outcomes matrix:get-row normalized-experienced-outcomes-
memory current-contract-nr 
(calculate agent's attitude towards the current contract and store it) 
let attitudes-current-contract calc-contract-attitudes normalized-experienced-outcomes 
(put the attitudes into the attitudes matrix) 
matrix:set-row attitudes current-contract-nr attitudes-current-contract 
(calculate the general attitudes)  
let general-attitude sum (matrix:get-row attitudes current-contract-nr) 
(insert the general attitude of the current contract into the list of general attitudes) 
set general-attitudes replace-item current-contract-nr general-attitudes general-attitude 
end             (end of procedure 'calc-attitudes') 
 
to evaluate-contract [ contract-nr ] 
(get the normalized average communicated outcomes)  
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let temp-communicated-outcomes matrix:get-row normalised-avg-communicated-
outcomes contract-nr 
(calculate attitudes)  
let attitudes-temp-contract calc-contract-attitudes temp-communicated-outcomes 
(put these attitudes into the prosumers-own matrix of expected attitudes) 
matrix:set-row own-expected-attitudes contract-nr attitudes-temp-contract 
end 
 
(iterate over available contracts to ask neighbours' opinion) 
to ask-neighbours-opinions [contract-nr ] 
(sum the attitudes of different neighbours) 
let summed-neighbours-attitude 0 
let nr-of-neighbours-with-experience 0 
(initialise provisional value for the number of contacts) 
let nr-of-contacts -100 
let loop-nr-of-contacts 0 
while [loop-nr-of-contacts < nr-of-interactions]  
[ifelse random-float 1 > heterogeneity  
[ask n-of 1 prosumers with [[archetype] of self = [archetype] of myself ]  
(if the prosumer has experience) 
[if item contract-nr general-attitudes > -100  
set nr-of-neighbours-with-experience nr-of-neighbours-with-experience+1 
(get the neighbours' attitude for this contract) 
let neighbours-attitude item contract-nr general-attitudes 
(add the neighbour's attitude to the summed attitudes) 
set summed-neighbours-attitude summed-neighbours-attitude + neighbours-attitude] 
]] 
(introduce heterogeneity, i.e. ask opinion from agents belonging to archetype different 
than the agent's own)  
[ask n-of 1 prosumers with [[archetype] of self != [archetype] of myself ]  
[if item contract-nr general-attitudes > -100  
(if the prosumer has experience) 
set nr-of-neighbours-with-experience nr-of-neighbours-with-experience + 1 
(get the neighbours' attitude for this contract) 
let neighbours-attitude item contract-nr general-attitudes 
(add the neighbour's attitude to the summed attitudes) 
set summed-neighbours-attitude summed-neighbours-attitude + neighbours-attitude] 
]] 
set loop-nr-of-contacts loop-nr-of-contacts + 1]            (end of 'while' loop) 
 
(initialise provisional value)  
let influenced-expected-general-attitude -100 
(if there is at least 1 neighbour with experience) 
ifelse nr-of-neighbours-with-experience > 0  
(calculate the average neighbours' general attitude for the respective contract) 
[let avg-neighbours-attitude summed-neighbours-attitude / nr-of-neighbours-with-
experience 
(create a temporary variable with the own expected attitude for the respective contract) 
let own-expected-general-attitude item contract-nr own-expected-general-attitudes 
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set influenced-expected-general-attitude own-expected-general-attitude + ( avg-
neighbours-attitude - own-expected-general-attitude ) * susceptibility] 
(if there are no neighbours with experience take agent's own expected attitude) 
[set influenced-expected-general-attitude item contract-nr own-expected-general-
attitudes] 
set influenced-expected-general-attitudes replace-item contract-nr influenced-expected-
general-attitudes influenced-expected-general-attitude 
end             (end of procedure 'ask-neighbours-opinions') 
 
(agents choose new contract)  
to choose-contract 
let old-contract-nr current-contract-nr 
(choose the contract with the best general attitude from the available contracts) 
let max-general-attitude max influenced-expected-general-attitudes 
set current-contract-nr position max-general-attitude influenced-expected-general-
attitudes 
(update the visual representation considering the new chosen contract) 
set xcor current-contract-nr 
(acknowledge if contract change took place) 
if old-contract-nr != current-contract-nr [ 
set changed-contract? true] 
end                                    (end of procedure 'choose-contract') 
   
(how satisfied the agent is with the choice of the new contract – i.e. how close the new 
contract matches consumer preferences) 
to calculate-satisfactions 
set attitude-satisfaction (item current-contract-nr general-attitudes) - threshold-attitude 
set techno-tolerance-satisfaction techno-tolerance-threshold - (item current-contract-nr 
techno-risks) 
end                             (end of procedure 'calculate-satisfactions') 
 
(introduce an environmental campaign) 
to do-environmental-campaign 
let percentage-increase 2  
(100% increase of agents biospehric weights) 
ask prosumers [ 
let bio-weight item BIOSPHERIC weights 
set bio-weight bio-weight * percentage-increase 
set weights replace-item BIOSPHERIC weights bio-weight 
(re-normalize the weights by dividing each of them by the total) 
set weights (map [ ? / sum weights ] weights) 
(the archetype might have changed, see what is the current maximum) 
let max-weight max weights 
set archetype position max-weight weights 
if archetype = EGOISTIC [set color red] 
if archetype = HEDONIC [set color blue] 
if archetype = BIOSPHERIC [set color green] 
if archetype = ALTRUISTIC [set color pink]] 
end        (end of procedure 'do-environmental-campaign') 
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 (prosumers initially having contract C) 
create-prosumers (prosumers-contract-C) [set current-contract-nr C] 
(prosumers initially having contract D) 
create-prosumers (prosumers-contract-D) [set current-contract-nr D] 
(prosumers initially having contract E) 
create-prosumers (prosumers-contract-E) [set current-contract-nr E] 
(prosumers initially having contract F) 
create-prosumers (prosumers-contract-F) [set current-contract-nr F] 
(prosumers initially having contract G) 
create-prosumers (prosumers-contract-G) [set current-contract-nr G] 
(introduce randomness in the archetype determination) 
let alternative-prosumer-nr 0  
ask prosumers  
(initialise total-outcomes to zero) 
[set total-outcomes n-values nr-of-perf-ind [0] 
(visualise the prosumers) 
setxy current-contract-nr random-ycor 
set shape "house" 
(There is not yet experience to compare with the threshold, so we presume satisfaction] 
set satisfied 1 
(determine the archetype of each prosumer based on the slider values) 
let archetype-determinant alternative-prosumer-nr / count prosumers 
ifelse archetype-determinant < share-ego [ 
set techno-tolerance-threshold (random-float 10) + 1 
      set archetype EGOISTIC 
      set color red] 
[ifelse archetype-determinant >= share-ego and archetype-determinant < share-ego + 
share-hedo [ 
set techno-tolerance-threshold (random-float 10) + 1 
set archetype HEDONIC 
set color blue]  
[ifelse archetype-determinant >= share-ego + share-hedo and archetype-
determinant < share-ego + share-hedo + share-bio [ 
      set techno-tolerance-threshold (random-float 10) + 1 
      set archetype BIOSPHERIC 
      set color green] 
[if archetype-determinant >= share-ego + share-hedo + share-bio [ 
      set techno-tolerance-threshold (random-float 10) + 1 
      set archetype ALTRUISTIC 
      set color pink]] 
]] 
(initialise weights for each of the 4 archetypes (ego, hedo, bio, alt) to a random number 
between 0 and 1) 
set weights n-values nr-of-perf-ind [random-float 1] 
(normalize the weights by dividing each of them by the sum) 
set weights (map [ ? / sum weights ] weights)  
(swap the maximum weight with the weight of the archetype) 
let max-weight max weights 
let max-index position max-weight weights 
let archetype-weight item archetype weights 
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set weights replace-item max-index weights archetype-weight 
set weights replace-item archetype weights max-weight 
(initialize outcomes, attitudes, etc.) 
set normalized-experienced-outcomes-memory matrix: from-row-list (n-values nr-of-
contracts [n-values nr-of-perf-ind [-100]]) 
set attitudes matrix: from-row-list (n-values nr-of-contracts [n-values nr-of-perf-ind [-
100]]) 
set own-expected-attitudes matrix: from-row-list (n-values nr-of-contracts [n-values nr-
of-perf-ind [-100]]) 
set general-attitudes n-values nr-of-contracts [-100] 
set own-expected-general-attitudes n-values nr-of-contracts [-100] 
set influenced-expected-general-attitudes n-values nr-of-contracts [-100] 
set experienced-outcomes n-values nr-of-perf-ind [-100] 
(set susceptibility equal to a value drawn from a uniform distribution between min and 
max – min and max are sliders) 
set susceptibility min-susceptibility + random-float (max-susceptibility - min-
susceptibility) 
(calculate the own expected general attitudes from the communicated outcomes) 
let loop-contract-nr 0 
while [ loop-contract-nr < nr-of-contracts]  
[evaluate-contract loop-contract-nr 
(calculate the general attitudes for each contract) 
let summed-attitudes sum (matrix: get-row own-expected-attitudes loop-contract-
nr) 
(general-attitude is the average of the four attitudes) 
let general-attitude (summed-attitudes / nr-of-perf-ind) 
set own-expected-general-attitudes replace-item loop-contract-nr own-expected-
general-attitudes general-attitude 
set loop-contract-nr loop-contract-nr + 1] 
(no contract is changed at the initial step) 
set changed-contract? False 
set alternative-prosumer-nr alternative-prosumer-nr + 1] 
end                  (end of procedure 'init-prosumers) 
 
to check-archetype-shares 
let total-shares share-ego + share-bio + share-hedo + share-alt 
if total-shares != 1 [ 
     error "The total shares of the archetypes do not equal 1" 
     stop] 
end                   (end of procedure 'check-archetype-shares) 
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